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Epiphenomenalism

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Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem. It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events. According to epiphenomenalism, the appearance that subjective mental states (such as intentions) influence physical events is an illusion, with consciousness being a by-product of physical states of the world. For instance, fear seems to make the heart beat faster, but according to epiphenomenalism the biochemical secretions of the brain and nervous system (such as adrenaline)—not the experience of fear—is what raises the heartbeat.[1] Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, yet have non-physical properties, epiphenomenalism is viewed as a form of property dualism.

Development

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During the 17th century, René Descartes argued that animals are subject to mechanical laws of nature. He defended the idea of automatic behavior, or the performance of actions without conscious thought. Descartes questioned how the immaterial mind and the material body can interact causally.[1] His interactionist model (1649) held that the body relates to the mind through the pineal gland.[2] La Mettrie, Leibniz, and Spinoza all in their own way began this way of thinking. The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by La Mettrie (1745), and then by Cabanis (1802), and was further explicated by Hodgson (1870)[3] and Thomas Henry Huxley (1874).[4][5]

Thomas Henry Huxley agreed with Descartes that behavior is determined solely by physical mechanisms, but he also believed that humans enjoy an intelligent life. In 1874, Huxley argued, in the Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, that animals are conscious automata. Huxley proposed that psychical changes are collateral products of physical changes. Like the bell of a clock that has no role in keeping the time, consciousness has no role in determining behavior.[1][2]

Huxley defended automatism by testing reflex actions, originally supported by Descartes. Huxley hypothesized that frogs that undergo lobotomy would swim when thrown into water, despite being unable to initiate actions. He argued that the ability to swim was solely dependent on the molecular change in the brain, concluding that consciousness is not necessary for reflex actions. According to epiphenomenalism, animals experience pain only as a result of neurophysiology.[1][2]

In 1870, Huxley conducted a case study on a French soldier who had sustained a shot in the Franco-Prussian war that fractured his left parietal bone. Every few weeks the soldier would enter a trance-like state, smoking, dressing himself, and aiming his cane like a rifle all while being insensitive to pins, electric shocks, odorous substances, vinegar, noise, and certain light conditions. Huxley used this study to show that consciousness was not necessary to execute these purposeful actions, justifying the assumption that humans are insensible machines. Huxley's mechanistic attitude towards the body convinced him that the brain alone causes behavior.[1][2]

In the early 1900s, scientific behaviorists such as Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner began the attempt to uncover laws describing the relationship between stimuli and responses, without reference to inner mental phenomena. Instead of adopting a form of eliminativism or mental fictionalism, positions that deny that inner mental phenomena exist, a behaviorist was able to adopt epiphenomenalism in order to allow for the existence of mind. George Santayana (1905) believed that all motion has physical causes. Because consciousness is accessory to life and not essential to it, natural selection is responsible for ingraining tendencies to avoid certain contingencies without any conscious achievement involved.[6] By the 1960s, scientific behaviorism met substantial difficulties and eventually gave way to the cognitive revolution. Participants in that revolution, such as Jerry Fodor, reject epiphenomenalism and insist upon the efficacy of the mind. Fodor even speaks of "epiphobia"—fear that one is becoming an epiphenomenalist.

However, since the cognitive revolution, there have been several who have argued for a version of epiphenomenalism. In 1970, Keith Campbell proposed his "new epiphenomenalism", which states that the body produces a spiritual mind that does not act on the body. How the brain causes a spiritual mind, according to Campbell, is destined to remain beyond our understanding forever.[7] In 2001, David Chalmers and Frank Jackson argued that claims about conscious states should be deduced a priori from claims about physical states alone. They offered that epiphenomenalism bridges, but does not close, the explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal realms.[8] These more recent versions maintain that only the subjective, qualitative aspects of mental states are epiphenomenal. Imagine both Pierre and a robot eating a cupcake. Unlike the robot, Pierre is conscious of eating the cupcake while the behavior is under way. This subjective experience is often called a quale (plural qualia), and it describes the private "raw feel" or the subjective "what-it-is-like" that is the inner accompaniment of many mental states. Thus, while Pierre and the robot are both doing the same thing, only Pierre has the inner conscious experience.

Frank Jackson (1982), for example, once espoused the following view:

I am what is sometimes known as a "qualia freak". I think that there are certain features of bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain... you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy....[9]

Some thinkers draw distinctions between different varieties of epiphenomenalism. In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett distinguishes between a purely metaphysical sense of epiphenomenalism, in which the epiphenomenon has no causal impact at all, and Huxley's "steam whistle" epiphenomenalism, in which effects exist but are not functionally relevant.

Arguments for

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Some neurophysiological data has been proffered in support of epiphenomenalism.[by whom?][citation needed] Some of the oldest such data is the Bereitschaftspotential or "readiness potential" in which electrical activity related to voluntary actions can be recorded up to two seconds before the subject is aware of making a decision to perform the action. More recently Benjamin Libet et al. (1979) have shown that it can take 0.5 seconds before a stimulus becomes part of conscious experience even though subjects can respond to the stimulus in reaction time tests within 200 milliseconds. The methods and conclusions of this experiment have received much criticism (e.g., see the many critical commentaries in Libet's (1985) target article), including fairly recently by neuroscientists such as Peter Tse, who claim to show that the readiness potential has nothing to do with consciousness at all.[10]

Arguments against

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The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self-contradictory: if we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then our brains know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then our brains should not have any knowledge about the mind, because the mind does not affect anything physical.[11]

However, some philosophers do not accept this as a rigorous refutation. For example, philosopher Victor Argonov states that epiphenomenalism is a questionable, but experimentally falsifiable theory. He argues that the personal mind is not the only source of knowledge about the existence of mind in the world. A creature (even a philosophical zombie) could have knowledge about the mind and the mind-body problem by virtue of some innate knowledge.[12] The information about the mind (and its problematic properties such as qualia and the hard problem of consciousness) could have been, in principle, implicitly "written" in the material world since its creation. Epiphenomenalists can say that God created an immaterial mind and a detailed "program" of material human behavior that makes it possible to speak about the mind–body problem. That version of epiphenomenalism seems highly exotic, but it cannot be excluded from consideration by pure theory. However, Argonov suggests that experiments could refute epiphenomenalism. In particular, epiphenomenalism could be refuted if neural correlates of consciousness can be found in the human brain, and it is proven that human speech about consciousness is caused by them.

Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, reject both epiphenomenalism and the existence of qualia with the same charge that Gilbert Ryle leveled against a Cartesian "ghost in the machine", that they too are category mistakes. A quale or conscious experience would not belong to the category of objects of reference on this account, but rather to the category of ways of doing things.

Functionalists assert that mental states are well described by their overall role, their activity in relation to the organism as a whole. "This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a 'calculating machine', but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century."[13] In so far as it mediates stimulus and response, a mental function is analogous to a program that processes input/output in automata theory. In principle, multiple realisability would guarantee platform dependencies can be avoided, whether in terms of hardware and operating system or, ex hypothesi, biology and philosophy. Because a high-level language is a practical requirement for developing the most complex programs, functionalism implies that a non-reductive physicalism would offer a similar advantage over a strictly eliminative materialism.

Eliminative materialists believe "folk psychology" is so unscientific that, ultimately, it will be better to eliminate primitive concepts such as mind, desire and belief, in favor of a future neuroscientific account. A more moderate position such as J. L. Mackie's error theory suggests that false beliefs should be stripped away from a mental concept without eliminating the concept itself, the legitimate core meaning being left intact.

Benjamin Libet's results are quoted[14] in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results.[15] Similar criticism of Libet-style research has been made by neuroscientist Adina Roskies and cognitive theorists Tim Bayne and Alfred Mele.

Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience and a conscious decision occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power… as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".[16] Mind–body dualists reject epiphenomenalism on the same grounds.

Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.[17]

A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in PNAS[18] challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), thus denying the conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's[19] and Fried's.[20]

In favor of interactionism, Celia Green (2003) argues that epiphenomenalism does not even provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of interaction posed by substance dualism. Although it does not entail substance dualism, according to Green, epiphenomenalism implies a one-way form of interactionism that is just as hard to conceive of as the two-way form embodied in substance dualism. Green suggests the assumption that it is less of a problem may arise from the unexamined belief that physical events have some sort of primacy over mental ones.

A number of scientists and philosophers, including William James, Karl Popper, John C. Eccles and Donald Symons, dismiss epiphenomenalism from an evolutionary perspective.[21][22][23][24][25] They point out that the view that mind is an epiphenomenon of brain activity is not consistent with evolutionary theory, because if mind were functionless, it would have disappeared long ago, as it would not have been favoured by evolution.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ a b c d e Walter, Sven. "Epiphenomenalism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. University of Bielefeld. Archived from the original on 23 September 2013. Retrieved 10 October 2013.
  2. ^ a b c d Robinson, William. "Epiphenomenalism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 1 November 2013.
  3. ^ Hodgson, Shadworth (1870). The Theory of Practice. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer.
  4. ^ Huxley, T. H. (1874). "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History", The Fortnightly Review, n.s.16:555–580. Reprinted in Method and Results: Essays by Thomas H. Huxley (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898)
  5. ^ Gallagher, S. 2006. "Where's the action?: Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will". In W. Banks, S. Pockett, and S. Gallagher. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Intuition (109–124). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
  6. ^ Scott, Alwyn (1995). Stairway to the Mind. New York, New York: Copernicus. p. 109. ISBN 9780387943817.
  7. ^ Griffin, David (1998). Unsnarling the World-Knot. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. p. 5. ISBN 9781556357558.
  8. ^ Polger, Thomas (2004). Natural Minds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. pp. 37–38. ISBN 9780262661966.
  9. ^ Jackson, 1982, p. 127.
  10. ^ Schlegel, Alexander; Alexander, Prescott; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Roskies, Adina; Ulric Tse, Peter; Wheatley, Thalia (May 2015). "Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition" (PDF). Consciousness and Cognition. 33: 196–203. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002. PMID 25612537. S2CID 3847731.
  11. ^ Robinson, William (2015). "Epiphenomenalism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 1 (Fall 2015 ed.). pp. 539–547. doi:10.1002/wcs.19. PMID 26271501. S2CID 239938469.
  12. ^ Argonov, Victor (2014). "Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach". Journal of Mind and Behavior. 35: 51–70. Archived from the original on 2016-10-20.
  13. ^ Levin, Janet (2010). "Functionalism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 ed.).
  14. ^ Wegner D., 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
  15. ^ Dennett, Daniel. (2003) Freedom evolves.
  16. ^ Flanagan, O.J. (1992). Consciousness Reconsidered. Bradford Books. MIT Press. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-262-56077-1. LCCN lc92010057.
  17. ^ Guggisberg, AG; Mottaz, A (2013). "Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?". Front Hum Neurosci. 7: 385. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385. PMC 3746176. PMID 23966921.
  18. ^ Schurger, Aaron; Sitt, Jacobo D.; Dehaene, Stanislas (16 October 2012). "An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 109 (42): 16776–16777. doi:10.1073/pnas.1210467109. PMC 3479453. PMID 22869750.
  19. ^ Libet, Benjamin; Gleason, Curtis A.; Wright, Elwood W.; Pearl, Dennis K. (1983). "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)". Brain. 106 (3): 623–42. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623. PMID 6640273.
  20. ^ Fried, Itzhak; Mukamel, Roy; Kreiman, Gabriel (2011). "Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition". Neuron. 69 (3): 548–62. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045. PMC 3052770. PMID 21315264.
  21. ^ James, William (1879). "Are we automata?". Mind. 4 (13): 1–22. doi:10.1093/mind/os-4.13.1.
  22. ^ Popper, Karl Raimund; Eccles, John Carew (1983). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. doi:10.4324/9780203537480. ISBN 9780203537480.
  23. ^ Symons, Donald (1979). The Evolution of Human Sexuality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  24. ^ Georgiev, Danko D. (2017-12-06). Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction (1st ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press. p. 362. doi:10.1201/9780203732519. ISBN 9781138104488. OCLC 1003273264. Zbl 1390.81001.
  25. ^ Georgiev, Danko D. (2020). "Inner privacy of conscious experiences and quantum information". BioSystems. 187: 104051. arXiv:2001.00909. doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2019.104051. PMID 31629783. S2CID 204813557.

Further reading

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  • Chalmers, David. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Green, Celia. (2003) The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford: Oxford Forum.
  • Jackson, Frank. (1982) "Epiphenomenal Qualia", The Philosophical Quarterly, 32, pp. 127–136. Online text
  • James, William. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, Henry Holt And Company. Online text
  • Libet, Benjamin; Wright, E. W.; Feinstein, B.; Pearl, D. K. (1979). "Subjective Referral of the Timing for a Conscious Sensory Experience". Brain. 102 (1): 191–221. doi:10.1093/brain/102.1.193. PMID 427530.
  • Libet, Benjamin (1985). "Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 8 (4): 529–566. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903. S2CID 6965339.
  • Robinson, William (2019) Epiphenomenal Mind: An Integrated Outlook on Sensations, Beliefs, and Pleasure, New York and London: Routledge.
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